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FROM A REPORTER'S PERSPECTIVE: A
PROPOSED AGENDA
Professor Aaron Twerski *:
Judge Pratt, ladies and gentlemen, before getting into a discus-
sion of the substantive changes that Professor Henderson and I
are proposing for the new Restatement, I would like to discuss
for a few moments the process which we will be following in de-
veloping the Restatement of Torts on Products Liability. 1 We
have been working almost exclusively since last September, when
we first met with our advisory group, on a preliminary draft of
the new Restatement. 2 Restatement (Second) 402A has only one
section.3 It has seventeen comments4 and given the time when it
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. 1962, Beth Medrash
Elyon Research Institute; B.S. 1970, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee;
J.D. 1965, Marquette University.
1. Professors Henderson and Twerski are the co-reporters of the Products
Liability section of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. On June 11, 1992, the
American Law Institute (A.L.I.) announced the names of their advisors. See
Institute Announces Advisory Committee for Restatement Product Liability
Revision, PROD. LIAB. DAILY (BNA) (June 11, 1992), available in
WESTLAW, BNA file. For a list of the practitioners, professors and judges
named to the committee see infra notes 6-8.
2. On March 18, 1992, the A.L.I. announced its plan to overhaul § 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The A.L.I. chose to begin its revision of
§ 402A because it "has proven so influential in the development of modem
product liability law" and the current formulation has become "increasingly
irrelevant and unresponsive to contemporary needs." See ALl to Begin Work
on Restatement (Third); Professors Propose Revisions to Section 4024, PROD.
LIAB. DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 18, 1992), available in WESTLAW, BNA file. In
May, 1992, authorities in the product liability field met to discuss the scope of
the new § 402A. It was decided that it "should focus on the 'core areas' unique
to product liability" and that five years would be devoted to the revision. Lmv
Institute Attendees Plan 5-Year Project; Members Agree on Core of Proposed
Treatise, PROD. LIAB. DAILY (BNA) (May 12, 1992), available in
WESTLAW, BNA file.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides in
pertinent part:
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was drafted in the early 1960's, I think it was all that could be
done.
We are now thirty years into the products liability revolution. It
is simply not possible to say all that needs to be said about the
products liability field in one section. Perhaps we may have
added to the confusion by writing our Cornell Law Review arti-
cle, entitled "A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts," in which we did follow the one
section format. 5 You have our word, we will not follow the one
section format here.
Hopefully, sometime within the next four to six weeks, we will
send out to the advisors, a group of twenty law professors, 6
practitioners, 7 and judges, 8 who are members of the advisory
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
4. See id. cmts. a-q.
5. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 1512 (1992).
6. Kenneth S. Abraham, University of Virginia School of Law; Paul
Weiler, Harvard Law School; Oscar S. Gray, University of Maryland School
of Law; Robert L. Rabin, Stanford Law School; Gary T. Schwartz, University
of California at Los Angeles School of Law; Marshall S. Shapo, Northwestern
University School of Law; Roger C. Cramton, Cornell Law School; Michael
D. Green, University of Iowa Law School.
7. Sheila L. Birnbaum, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (New
York); Robert L. Habush, Habush, Habush, Habush & Davis (Milwaukee);
Paul D. Rheingold, Rheingold & McGowan, P.C. (New York); Victor E.
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group of the American Law Institute (A.L.I.), 9 the first seven
sections on the new proposed Restatement plus comments and re-
porters notes. It is likely that we will write another fourteen sec-
tions during the next two to three years. The first seven sections
are the heart of the project since they constitute the prima facie
case and the affirmative defenses.
When our preliminary draft is completed, it will be reviewed
by the advisors and other A.L.I. members who have joined a
Members Consultative Group.10 We will meet with both groups
during the second week of June and will take their comments into
account and then prepare a draft which will go to the American
Law Institute Council. 11 As I understand it, the members of our
advisory group do not vote on our draft. 12 Similarly, participants
Schwartz, Crowell & Moring (Washington, D.C.); Michael Traynor, Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund (San Francisco); Bill Wagner, Wagner,
Cunningham, Baughan & McLaughlin (Tampa); Conrad K. Harper, Simpson,
Thatcher & Bartlett (New York); John W. Martin Jr., Vice President and
General Counsel, Ford Motor Co. (Detroit).
8. Hon. Dineen King (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit); Hon.
Hans A. Linde (Oregon Supreme Court); Hon. Vincent L. McKusick
(Supreme Judicial Court of Maine); Hon. Robert E. Keeton (U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts).
9. The A.L.I. was founded on February 23, 1923 on the recommendation
of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the
Improvement of the Law. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF TORTS at vii-viii
(1934). The objective of the A.L.I. is to "present an orderly statement of the
general common law of the United States, including.. . the law developed
solely by judicial decision... [and] the law that has grown from the
application by the courts of statutes that have been generally enacted and have
been enforced for many years." Id. at viii-ix. This objective is reached to the
extent that "the legal profession accepts the Restatement as prima facie a
correct statement of the general law of the United States." Id. at ix.
10. This group is comprised of members of the A.L.I. who have expressed
an interest in the revision of § 402A. For a list of members as of April 1, 1993
see AMERICAN LAw INSTrrTE, 1993 ANN. REP. at 108-10 (1993) [hereinafter
A.L.I. REP.].
11. The Council is the executive body of the A.L.I. whose function is to
review preliminary drafts and amend these drafts when necessary. See
RESTATE rENT OF HE LAW OF TORTS at viii (1934).
12. The Director of the A.L.I. may appoint advisors to review the
preliminary drafts of a reporter before they are submitted to the Council.
A.L.I. REP. at 53.
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in the Members Consultative Group do not have a vote. The
American Law Institute Council, however, will vote on the ac-
ceptability of the Council draft, and if it finds favor in their eyes,
they will then pass it on to the membership or send it back to us
for revisions. At that point, after the American Law Institute
Council has reached the conclusion that this draft is worthwhile,
it becomes a tentative draft, to be discussed and voted upon at the
A.L.I. meetings in May of 1994.13 Whether or not we will ac-
tually be on the program in May of 1994 is anyone's guess. I do
not know the answer to that question. It may be that the Ameri-
can Law Institute Council might take the position that it ought to
be reviewed as a total package and they will want all of the other
sections before them before any vote is taken. I do not know
what the politics of that will be. I can only tell you where we are
right now. We are preparing to send out a draft to our advisors
around the middle of April of 1993. My understanding is that our
preliminary draft is not supposed to become public; it is for the
eyes of the advisors and the Members Consultative Group. My
own prediction is that Xerox machines will be working overtime,
that it will be the world's worst kept secret. That is probably all
for the best.
Bar liaison groups from the American Bar Association, trial
groups such as the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
13. See A.L.I. REP. at 46. The general procedure and authorization for the
publication of restatements is as follows:
1. Material intended for publication shall first be submitted to the
Council, and by it to the members.
2. The Council may submit the material to the membership with or
without its approval, amendment, or recommendations.
3. The membership may approve, reject, or amend any matter submitted
by the Council and may authorize the Council to make such
changes as the Council deems proper.
4. The Council shall make or authorize such final editorial or other
revisions as it deems appropriate and shall determine the form,
time, and manner of publication.
5. No publication using the name of the Institute shall be made without
the authorization of the Council.
Id. at 54.
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(ATLA), 14 and defense oriented organizations such as the Prod-
uct Liability Advisory Council (PLAC), 15 will also comment on
our drafts. The drafts are not written in stone. We are looking for
intelligent insights and hope to be responsive to good criticism. 16
Now to the substance. Since we are still polishing the drafts of
the black letter and the comments, I think it would be inappro-
priate to set out in any detail the language of the proposals that
we are working with. I think our advisors and the Members Con-
sultative Group deserve the first crack at it. Nonetheless, I think
there are some very broad strokes that we can set forth that will
be of considerable interest.
Let us go back for a minute in history. When Dean Prosser
wrote section 402A back in the early 1960's, products liability
law was at its infancy. 17 When Prosser had written his tentative
draft of section 402A, 18 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc. 19
had just been decided and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products
Co., Inc.20 had not yet been decided. The assault on privity was
the issue of the day. 2 1 The basic thrust of products liability law,
14. Established in 1946, and consisting of 65,000 members, ATLA is
committed to fostering a safer, more just society by protecting victims' rights
in various areas, including product safety.
15. PLAC is a non-profit, industry group, consisting of defense attorneys
and manufacturers that submit amicus briefs on product liability cases.
16. For criticism and suggestions regarding the first preliminary draft of
§ 402A see Hildy Bowbeer, The ALl's Restatement on Products Liability:
Some Early Concerns and Suggested Revisions, PROD. LIAB. DAILY (BNA)
(Aug. 2, 1993), available in WESTLAW, BNA file.
17. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); William L. Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 793-94
(1966) (describing the products liability field during the 1960's as "the most
rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire
history of the law of torts").
18. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft
No. 7, 1962) (including a section imposing strict liability for products
intended for intimate bodily use); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 1961) (advocating the adoption of § 402A).
19. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
20. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
21. See Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 90
N.W.2d 873, 880 (Mich. 1958) ("[M]anufacturer is not excused... [from
1993]
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at the time, dealt with manufacturing defects. 22 There were
strong feelings about the inappropriateness of having a negligence
regime to decide the issue of liability for such defects. The Re-
statement thus sought to rid products liability law of two doc-
trines: (1) privity and (2) reasonableness of quality control as a
defense to a case based on a manufacturing defect. 23 Design de-
fect 24 and failure-to-warn 25 litigation were in their infancy and
you will look in vain to the language of section 402A to find
liability] merely because there happened to be a lack of any privity .... ");
Henningsen, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (holding that privity is not required
because it violates public policy).
22. A manufacturing defect is defined as "an abnormality or a condition
that was unintended, and makes the product more dangerous than it would
have been as intended." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984); see, e.g., Chandler v. Anchor
Serum Co., 426 P.2d 82 (Kan. 1967) (recovery of loss to herd of livestock due
to defective animal serum); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 111 So. 305
(Miss. 1927) (holding manufacturer liable for injuries resulting from broken
glass in a bottle of Coca-Cola); MacPherson v. Buick Motors, 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (holding manufacturer liable for injuries caused by
defective wheel).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) which provides that
strict liability may be imposed on a seller although: "(a) the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b)
the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller." Id.
24. A design defect occurs when the product is manufactured in
conformity with the intended design but the design itself poses unreasonable
dangers to consumers. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1543 (1973); see W. Page Keeton, Manufacturer's
Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of
Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969).
25. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 96, at 685 which states:
A manufacturer or other seller is subject to liability for failing to warn
or adequately to warn about a risk or hazard inherent in the way a
product is designed that is related to the intended uses as well as the
reasonably foreseeable uses that may be made of the products it sells.
Id.; see, e.g., Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957)
(action against manufacturer for failure to warn of dangerous side effects of
deodorant); Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Or. 1963)
(holding manufacturer liable for failing to warn of the long-lasting
contamination potential of sodium arsenate used in garden weed killer).
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anything like a clear definition dealing with these issues. As the
law began to develop, strict products liability became a kind of
anthem. It became a kind of code word for change - much of it
very healthy. Courts did not want themselves restrained by lim-
ited duty doctrines such as the "open and obvious" danger rule,26
or the "bystander" rule27 and similar kinds of artificial
limitations on recovery. Strict liability became a sort of clarion
call for change. When courts were faced with traditional argu-
ments seeking to bar recovery, they responded by saying, "Those
arguments were sufficient to bar an action based on negligence
but not one based on strict liability."
We are now thirty years into the revolution and the idea that we
can have one single definition for manufacturing defect, design
defect and failure-to-warn seems clearly wrong to us. The fact of
the matter is that the courts, treatise writers and scholars all or-
ganize the subject around these three categories. In the Cornell
article and in our preliminary draft, we define defect based on
these functional categories. 28
26. Also known as the patent danger rule or the latent-patent rule, this
doctrine states that a manufacturer of a product is under no duty to protect
against open, obvious or patent dangers. Under this doctrine, liability may not
be imposed upon a manufacturer for injury resulting from a defective product
unless such injury was caused by a latent or hidden danger or defect. See
Theresa L. Kruk, Annotation, Products Liability: Modern Status of Rule that
there is No Liability for Patent or Obvious Dangers, 35 A.L.R. 861, 863 n.2
(4th ed. 1985); see, e.g., Ford v. Hamischfeger Corp., 365 F. Supp. 602
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (finding obvious danger of a forklift crane did not preclude
recovery); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 235 (Cal. 1970)
("[M]odem approach does not preclude liability solely because a danger is
obvious."); Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387, 348 N.E.2d
571, 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 122 (1976) ("[P]atent-danger doctrine should
not, in and of itself, prevent a plaintiff from establishing his case.").
27. See Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1278 (8th
Cir. 1972) (applying Iowa law) (acknowledging that bystanders are covered by
strict liability); Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1970) (applying
Vermont law) (manufacturer liable to innocent bystander where automobile
was sold in defective condition); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d
84, 88-89 (Cal. 1969) (extending protection to injured bystanders on rationale
that bystander has even less control over instrumentality than purchaser or
user).
28. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 1519-22 (comments g-j).
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Now to the sixty-four dollar question, "What happens to strict
liability and negligence?" Should we adopt a doctrinal approach
drawing sharp distinctions between negligence and strict liability?
In our Cornell article, we suggested that we ought to stay away
from doctrinal distinctions. 29 We thought it was a good idea
then. We think it is a good idea now. The fact of the matter is
that manufacturing defect cases are essentially true strict liability
cases in that the conduct of the defendant is irrelevant. 30 In de-
sign and failure-to-warn cases, since we are dealing primarily
with whether the product was reasonably designed or whether
there was a reasonable warning given, it becomes negligence-like
in its approach. 3 1 But it is not functionally equivalent with the
traditional negligence doctrine. 32
29. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 1532. ("[Ilt is unlikely
that the distinction between this test [strict liability] and the negligence test is
sufficiently significant to warrant the creation of a separate track for liability.
In any event, we do not believe that the issue is of sufficient moment to saddle
our revision with it.").
30. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 958 (Md. 1976)
("The relevant inquiry in a strict liability action focuses not on the conduct of
the manufacturer but rather on the product itself."); Phillips v. Kimwood
Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974) ("To impose [strict] liability
there has to be something about the article which makes it dangerously
defective without regard to whether the manufacturer was or was not at fault
for such condition."); see generally KEErON sr AL., supra note 22, at 695-97.
31. See, e.g., Balido v. Improved Mach. Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972) ("A manufacturer's failure to achieve its full potential in
design ... is a liability whose essence parallels the lack of due care that is the
essence of its liability for negligence."); Fiberboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845
P.2d 1168, 1174 (Colo. 1993) (noting that courts should not "shy away from
using appropriate 'negligence terms' that are necessary to properly define
defect and unreasonably dangerous in the context of either design defect or
failure to warn claims"); Jarrel v. Monsanto Co., 528 N.E.2d 1158, 1168 n.7
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988) ("[I]n cases involving deficient or absent warnings as the
sole 'defect' or 'defective condition' we have nothing more and nothing less
than a negligence action.. . ."); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176,
183-84 (Mich. 1984) (stating "It]he underlying negligence calculus is
inescapable" in determining the liability in a design defect case); Feldman v.
Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984) (stating that negligence and
strict liability may be deemed to be "functional equivalents" in failure to warn
cases); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products
Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435, 462-63 (1979) (observing that although
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John Vargo used a very good phrase on the phone with me one
day. We were talking about negligence and John asked whether
we were talking about "old negligence" or "new negligence." I
thought that was a very valuable insight; it stuck with me. Tradi-
tional negligence comes with a lot of baggage that we may not
wish to import into products liability law. There is good reason to
stop and think about whether or not we wish to spend our efforts
in fighting the doctrinal battles. Our position is that we should
look at what the elements of the cause of action are, describe
them and then leave the courts free to adopt the terminological
labels which they are most comfortable with. There is going to be
a need to take sides on the issue of what it takes to make a design
defect.
We have argued in our Cornell article that the fundamental
definition for design defect must be "risk-utility" based. 33 There
is only one serious competitor to "risk-utility" and that is the
"consumer expectation" test. 34 I think properly understood, the
"consumer expectation" test simply does not work as an adequate
test in a design defect setting. There are a small subclass of
characterized as a form of strict liability, failure to warn defects are really a
form of negligence).
32. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 1532.
33. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 5, at 1532-33. A product is
defectively designed under a "risk-utility" analysis if its inherent danger
outweighs its utility. KEETON Er AL., supra note 22, at 699.
34. Under the "consumer expectation" test, a product is defectively
dangerous if it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). For an application of this test see
Toliver v. General Motors Corp, 482 So. 2d 213, 218-19 (Miss. 1986) (en
bane) (holding that the product's design fell below the standard of design
contemplated by the user and thus became unreasonably dangerous to the
user); Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 242 S.E.2d 671 (S.C. 1978) (holding that a
manufacturer's failure to install a safety device to a boat's motor did not
constitute a defect unreasonably dangerous to the consumer); Menard v.
Newhall, 373 A.2d 505 (Vt. 1977) (holding that a BB gun is not dangerous
beyond that which could be contemplated by an ordinary consumer). But see
Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 253 (Miss. 1993) (holding
that Missouri now follows the "risk-utility" test).
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design defect cases that can go off on a form of consumer
expectation. For example, when a product fails in its intended
use, very much like the car failed in the famous Henningsen
case, 35 identifying the form of defect is a matter of monumental
insignificance. If that is true, we ought to be able to cabinet that
class of cases separately and functionally identify them.
However, most design defect cases are what my colleague,
Professor Henderson has called "conscious design choice"
cases. 36 These are cases where the manufacturer has a design
choice in front of it and has to decide which design to choose.
Assuming we face these conscious design choice cases in courts,
and we do every day, these cases ought to be decided on "risk-
utility" grounds. The authority, as we see it throughout the
country, both judicially and academically, is overwhelmingly in
support. 37 Even the courts that attempt to decide design defect
cases on the basis of some form of "consumer expectation" fall
back on "risk-utility" theory. 3 8 Consumer expectations are de-
35. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
36. See generally Henderson, supra note 24.
37. See Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246-49 (Colo.
1987) (en banc) (applying a "risk-utility" analysis where manufacturer of
motorcycle failed to equip motorcycle with leg protection devices); Phipps v.
General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 961 (Md. 1976) (acknowledging that
design defect requires the balancing of utility of design against the magnitude
of risk); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984) (adopting a
pure "risk-utility" test for products liability action predicated upon defective
designs); Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984) (applying
a "risk-utility" analysis in evaluating manufacturer's conscious choice of
design where employee was injured when a forklift truck fell on him); Thibault
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978) (applying "risk-
utility" analysis where consumer was injured by power lawnmower in a
manner contrary to manufacturer's instructions); see also Sheila L. Birnbaum,
Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to
Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980) (discussing "risk-
utility" analysis); W. Page Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products
Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579 (1980)
(advocating abandonment of the "consumer expectation" test and adopting the
"risk-utility" test).
38. See Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg., Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa
1978) (determining whether the product was dangerous to an unreasonable
extent required a balancing of the product's risk and liability); Baughn v.
[Vol 10
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fined as "reasonable" consumer expectations. When you ask what
do consumers reasonably expect, the answer is that they can ex-
pect reasonably designed products. This gets us back to "risk-
utility" analysis. It seems to us that we ought not have to go this
circuitous route to arrive at "risk-utility" analysis. There are a
host of subsidiary questions that we will have to deal with in the
comments and in later sections, but the fundamental defect test
really ought to be "risk-utility."
Let me mention one other major issue where a tough decision
has got to be made. It is one of the areas in which everyone
admits section 402A has been a monumental failure. Section
402A comment k,39 that deals with so-called "unavoidably unsafe
products" (prescription drugs), is a masterpiece of confusion and
double-speak. 40 I have regularly offered an "A" in my course to
Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 727 P.2d 655, 660 (Wash. 1986) (en bane) ("In
determining a consumer's expectations regarding a product's safety, factors
such as the relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from
the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the
risk are to be considered."); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774,
779 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (treating "consumer expectation" test as an
element in a "risk-utility" analysis).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). Comment k
reads in pertinent part:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of
drugs .... Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous.
Id.
40. See Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against
Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853 (1983);
Aaron D. Twerski, National Product Liability Legislation: In Search for the
Best of All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REv. 411 (1982). There is a
significant amount of discrepancy among the courts regarding the nature and
scope of comment k. Some courts interpret comment k as reducing strict
liability to a negligence standard. See Plummer v. Lederle Lab., 819 F.2d
349, 356 (2d Cir.) ("Drug manufacturers are obligated by law to provide
doctors and/or consumers with the adequate knowledge of the hazards of the
drugs they manufacture. If they do so, they are held not to a strict liability
standard... but to a negligence standard."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898
19931
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any student who could explain it to me, and so far I have given
A's, but none because the student was able to explain section
402A comment k. I think this comment seeks to address the
problem of drug design, but I cannot be sure. If it is talking
about drug design, it is very difficult to understand because it
compares a drug design case with a non-drug design case. How-
ever, since there is no authority in the Restatement on how to
cover non-drug design cases, I do not know how to distinguish
out drug design cases.
There is a possibility that section 402A comment k speaks only
to the warning issue. If it speaks to the warning issue, I am not
certain whether or not there is liability under the Restatement for
unforeseeable risks arising from drugs. The language can be in-
terpreted both ways. On the other hand, the judicial authority in
the drug field is clear -- there is no liability for unforeseeable re-
actions or for unforeseeable risks arising from drugs.4 1 The
authority is crystal clear throughout the country. I do not know of
a single exception to that statement.
Now, the real tough issue on which we will have to make a
decision is whether the A.L.I. should recognize a cause of action
for defective drug design. One possible solution is to say that
drug design litigation ought not to exist at all. 42 The other is it
(1987); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305, 1318 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1980) ("[lt is clear that although the comment k rules appear under
the title 'Topic 5. Strict Liability' in the Restatement, they are not strict
liability rules at all. They are merely rules of negligence embodying the long-
standing concepts of a lack of due care and forseeability of the risk."). But see
Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981)
(precluding comment k immunity where plaintiff suffered injury following
ingestion of oral contraceptive); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 308
(Idaho 1987) ("We do not believe comment k was intended to provide nor
should it provide all ethical drugs with blanket immunity from strict liability
design defect claims.").
41. See Ferrigno, 420 A.2d 1305; Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206
(Pa. 1971); see also Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 199-200
(Ill. 1980) (recognizing that a contrary rule would deter the introduction of
new and useful products).
42. Those opposed to drug design litigation argue that a decision by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to license a drug and make it available
through prescription is sufficient to render it "unavoidably unsafe" as a matter
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ought to exist under some very special rules. 4 3 Let me tell you
what I think the controversy is all about. It is clear that drug de-
sign cases are a different animal. If we were to take the position
that a drug is defectively designed, when that drug can service a
specific group of patients who need the drug, I think we would
be making a terrible mistake. Nobody wants to say that a drug is
defectively designed if it is a drug of choice for a discreet group
of patients. What needs to be done in that instance is to warn,
and to warn very sharply and very accurately, about the dangers
of the drug, limiting the drug to its appropriate use.
The question arises in today's world in which drug companies
put out huge numbers of drugs, whether or not there is a legiti-
mate place for drug design cases, because a drug can come on the
market that has no social utility for even a discreet group of pa-
tients. Now I could make the argument that if that were the case,
failure-to-warn would operate because the manufacturer clearly
would have a duty to warn that the drug simply does not function
or does not have a particularly good use. Let me give you an ex-
ample. Consider the Ortho-Novum birth control pill44 manufac-
of law, thus making the court's role unnecessary. See McDaniel v. McNeil
Lab., Inc., 241 N.W.2d 822 (Neb. 1976) (FDA approval of safety not subject
to challenge without proof of fraud or nondisclosure); John P. Reilly, The
Erosion of Comment k, 14 U. DAYTON L. REv. 255 (1989) (suggesting that a
manufacturer's compliance with the FDA regulatory process should entitle the
manufacturer to a rebuttable presumption indicating that at the time a
prescription drug is manufactured, the apparent benefit of the product
outweighs its apparent risks); Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe
Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind Comment k, 42 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1139, 1142-43 (1985) (stating the underlying policy behind
comment k applies to drugs in which there has been reasonable care on the part
of the manufacturer, and presumably on the part of the FDA).
43. See Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968)
(stating that it must be determined whether the drug's benefits justify its use);
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 545 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979) (balancing public interest in availability of a drug against attendant
risks).
44. Ortho-Novum is an oral contraceptive manufactured by the Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corporation. For a comparable illustration of this example see
Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (Ist Cir. 1981) (holding
manufacturer liable for injuries resulting from the ingestion of a birth control
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tured at a 100 milligram dose, when a 50 milligram dose will
provide adequate protection and present far less risk to the pa-
tient. Is that a design defect case or a failure-to-warn case? At
first blush, it is a failure-to-warn case because the manufacturer
clearly should be warning the user, do not use 100 milligrams
when 50 will do, 100 milligrams gives you more risk. On the
other hand, there may be a role for design defect. Why the devil
would you manufacture and sell the 100 milligram dose? It serves
no useful function. Now the argument on the other side is that
opening drugs to design litigation will create a new category of
litigation when none presently exists. The fact of the matter is
that in the last couple of years, there has been a fair amount of
discussion by the courts recognizing the possibility of drug design
litigation. We have heard both opinions and we will have to work
it out. It should be clear, however, that the issue is not whether
strict liability or negligence applies to design defect cases. No-
body in a drug design case has ever imposed strict liability. No
one has imputed knowledge to a drug manufacturer which it
could not have reasonably obtained through reasonable testing
and development. There is no such thing as true strict liability in
design litigation. So to say you are creating a section 402A com-
ment k exemption for strict liability when it does not exist in de-
sign litigation seems to me a strange way to talk about the prob-
lem.
Let me conclude now with a few final observations. I think that
this project is very doable. I believe we can effectively and hon-
estly restate the law of products liability. I hope the new Re-
statement will clarify concepts that have been unnecessarily con-
fused, but I think that part of the problem is the fact that we will
indeed need to clarify the law.
I have a joke that I tell my students about a religious Jewish
man who decided that he was going to sort of give up the faith
and wanted to eat ham. He went into a delicatessen and marched
over to the display counter, pointed to the ham and said: "Give
pill containing 100 milligrams of estrogen where an equally effective but far
less dangerous contraceptive containing only 50 milligrams of estrogen was
available).
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me a piece of that," and the clerk behind the counter said, "Do
you mean the ham, sir?" He said, "Who asked you to name it?"
We are likely to be criticized for identifying the "ham." Why
should someone be against clarification? The answer is that it al-
lows for strategic behavior on the part of the lawyers. When you
are dealing with terms that make sense only to the Oracle at Del-
phi, there is room for huge amounts of maneuvering. Lawyers
are jealous of that maneuvering space and sometimes correctly
so. We have not written and will not write a manifesto for "law
reform." Although we have our own personal view about what
the law of products liability should be, we have not imposed
them on the Restatement. But we will impose some clarity, and
there are costs to clarity. Thirty years into the product revolution,
we think that the time has come to do that. Thank you.

